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ON THE CLOCK, BEST BET TO DRAFT
CYBERDEFENSIVE LINEMEN: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF SPORTS BETTING FROM A
CYBERSECURITY PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
On May 14, 2018, Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion for the
United States Supreme Court in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). The Professional and Amateur Protection Act
(PASPA), a twenty-six-year-old federal statute, was deemed
unconstitutional; thus, this decision allows state legislatures to legalize
sports betting within their borders. With many states independently
legalizing sports gambling, the regulatory landscape throughout the
country is becoming a patchwork of state statutes. Additionally, top tier
sporting organizations heavily depend on data analytics to formulate game
plan strategy, train efficiently, rehab player injuries, gauge team and player
performance, etc. The popularity of sports gambling continues to grow in
the United States, and the proliferation of data usage will only expand as
teams and players seek a competitive advantage. However, sports teams
and athletes are not the only entities seeking an edge, as hackers will
attempt to steal private and proprietary data for a significant edge when
placing sports bets. It is imperative that leagues, teams, sports betting
operators, and legislators must not overlook the cybersecurity component
when regulating the industry. This Note argues that federal regulatory
oversight is the most favorable approach from a cybersecurity perspective,
and states can build on this framework as they see fit. Federal agencies,
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC), and federal law enforcement agencies, are well-versed
in persistent cybersecurity issues and compliance regulations. A central,
federal regulatory model is advantageous to the growth and integrity of the
blossoming sports gambling industry and the established sports industry.
INTRODUCTION
“I am sensitive to arguments in favor of deferring to the States, and I
believe that the Federal Government should be careful to preempt state
authority only when an issue is of national importance. But, based on what
I know about the dangers of sports betting, I contend that its dangers are of
national importance. Such dangers and the interstate effects of sports
betting justify this Federal action.”
- Bill Bradley, National Basketball Association (NBA) Hall-of-Famer
& former United States Senator for New Jersey1
1. Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
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The highly anticipated United States Supreme Court decision, Murphy
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, struck down the Professional
and Amateur Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA).2 This signaled a “win” for
federalism and those entities clamoring for their piece of the proverbial pie
in an expanding legalized sports gambling landscape.3 In its decision, the
Court relied on the Tenth Amendment and its anti-commandeering doctrine.
As Justice Alito wrote for the majority, “Our job is to interpret the law
Congress has enacted and decide whether it is consistent with the
Constitution. PASPA is not. PASPA ‘regulate[s] state governments’
regulation’ of interstate commerce. The Constitution gives Congress no
such power.”4 The entire statute was deemed unconstitutional, rather than
severing and salvaging parts of the statute, as Justice Ginsberg advocated
for in her dissent.5 Ultimately, Justice Alito stated for the majority,
“legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy choice, but the
choice is not ours to make. Congress can regulate sports gambling directly,
but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”6 This 6-3
decision allows individual states to legalize and regulate sports betting
within their borders.7 Since the Murphy decision, several states swiftly
acted to legalize sports betting.8 Additionally, New York and Arkansas
recently passed a bill opening the door to legalizing sports betting with
plans to operate legal sports books in the future.9
Congr. 1–2 (2018) (statement of Jocelyn Moore, Executive Vice President, Communications and
Public Affairs, National Football League) https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/NFL-Statement-House-Judiciary-Post-PASPA-Hearing-Sept.-27-
2018.pdf (quoting Bill Bradley during the 1992 Senate debate of the PASPA bill) [hereinafter
Moore, Post-PASPA].
2. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018).
3. See Sam Kamin, Murphy v. NCAA: It’s about much more than gambling on sport, THE
HILL (May 15, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387653-murphy-v-ncaa-its-
about-much-more-than-gambling-on-sports.
4. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992)).
5. See id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting that, “When a statute reveals a constitutional
flaw the Court ordinarily engages in a salvage rather than a demolition operation . . . The Court
wields an ax to cut down § 3702 instead of using a scalpel to trim the statute . . . Deleting the
alleged ‘commandeering’ direction would free the statute to accomplish just what Congress
legitimately sought to achieve: stopping sports gambling regimes while making it clear that the
stoppage is attributable to federal, not state, action.”).
6. Id. at 1484–85.
7. See Craig A. Newman, Cybercrime Meets Insider Trading in Sports, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/business/dealbook/sports-betting-cybercrime.html.
8. See Ryan Rodenberg, State-by-State Sports Betting Bill Tracker, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2019),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tracker-all-50-states
(reporting that as of February 24, 2019, these states include Delaware, New Jersey, Mississippi,
West Virginia, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, joining Nevada, Oregon, and
Montana, which already have grandfathered exemptions under PASPA. This list has been updated
multiple terms over the course of writing this Note, as the industry continues to expand to
additional states).
9. See id.
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The economic environment, where the likes of New Jersey fought for
the overturning of PASPA, had individual states clamoring for new sources
of revenue despite a thriving national economy.10 Despite unemployment
figures at a seventeen-year low and stock markets flourishing for most of
2018, state governments are still tapping into “rainy-day funds” and relying
on “one-time gimmicks.”11 In 2017, twenty-seven states did not realize their
revenue expectations and quick fixes were no longer available.12 However,
since New Jersey sports books became operational in June 2018, the New
Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement released sports wagering revenue
results of $40,449,676 from June through September 2018, with
$23,961,038 coming from September alone.13 With an influx of revenue on
the minds of state legislators, as many as twenty-two additional states as
well as Washington, D.C., have introduced bills seeking to legalize sports
betting.14 With the seemingly vast profitability, it will only be a matter of
time before many of the remaining states explore legalization. However,
there are pitfalls to rapidly scaling an industry, such as protecting the
entities and data from formidable cyberincendiaries.
On September 27, 2018, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations held a hearing titled,
“Post PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America.”
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) laid out three options
for ‘post-Murphy,’ “including: (1) reenact a federal ban on sports betting by
prohibiting corporations (and not states) from engaging in sports betting
activities; (2) have Congress defer to the states and allow states to legalize
and regulate the business; or (3) have Congress adopt uniform minimum
standards to provide guidance to states that choose to legalize.”15 This Note
will argue that the scope of data and cyber protection of sports franchises’
information necessitates federal intervention to complement state policies
and regulations. Sports franchises and leagues, State Gaming Commissions,
10. See The Data Team, Despite a strong economy, American states are desperate for revenue,
THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/04/06/despite-a-
strong-economy-american-states-are-desperate-for-revenue.
11. See id.
12. See id. (according to the National Association of State Budget Officers).
13. See Press Release from Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, DGE Announces September
2018 Total Gaming Revenue Results, New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety (Oct. 12,
2018), available at https://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/docs/Financials/PressRel2018/September2018.pdf
(signifying September revenue results—$23,961,038 up from $16,487,491 from the previous three
months combined—are more indicative of anticipated revenue as online sports gambling has
launched and more sportsbooks are available. This September boom is likely increased by the
commencement of the 2018 American football seasons.).
14. See Rodenberg, supra note 8 (noting that 17 states are considered to be in the ‘moving
toward legalization’ category).
15. Laurie McKay, Mark A. Clayton, & Edward R. Winkofsky, Post PASPA: An Examination
of Sports Betting in America, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP ALERT: GAMING (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2018/9/post-paspa-an-examination-of-sports-betting-in-
america.
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and state governments are not sufficiently equipped to protect against
cybercriminals, especially as the internet plays a significant role in the
growing legalized sports gambling industry.
This Note will explore and offer suggestions to resolve regulatory
issues facing the sports and sports betting industries within the scope of
cybersecurity. Part I provides an overview of sports data analytics and its
increasing value to leagues, teams, and players. Part II discusses the various
categories of data in sports, while Part III explores notable cyberattacks in
the sporting landscape. Part IV reviews the state of cybersecurity measures
and the role of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in consumer
protection from unfair and deceptive practices. Part V compares the issue of
sports betting to the securities market and the lessons to be gleaned from the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) approach to outsider trading
liability. Lastly, Part VI addresses the arguments for state regulation of
sports betting and the shortcomings of state regulation due to the
development of the internet and heavy reliance on data.
I. THE EXPLOSION OF VALUABLE SPORTS DATA
While the legalized sports betting industry is nascent, data analytics are
undeniably ubiquitous with professional and amateur sports, namely
Division I collegiate athletics. The “Big Data” revolution has arrived and
“increasingly large datasets are being mined for important and often
surprising insights.”16 Complex statistics and sabermetrics17 have inundated
sports fans in the search for objective knowledge about sports.18 The
Oakland Athletics’ success and the release of Moneyball19 propelled a new
view of statistical methods and sports strategy into the minds of front office
executives.20 The tremendous volume of data gathered and analyzed by
teams across the sporting landscape is a sophisticated effort to gain a
16. Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
393 (2014).
17. Sabermetrics strives to quantify athletes’ (originally baseball players’) performances
“based on objective statistical measurements, especially in opposition to many of the established
statistics that give less accurate approximations of individual efficacy.” Rob Neyer, Sabermetrics,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/sports/sabermetrics (last visited Mar. 3,
2019). For some of the earliest famed sabermetric authors like Pete Palmer and Bill James,
“sabermetrics centered around understanding, around reconciling the differences between what
they saw on the field and how those within baseball said the game was played and won.” Jack
Moore, How Wall Street Strangled the Life Out of Sabermetrics, VICE SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014,
8:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/aem895/how-wall-street-strangled-the-life-out-of-
sabermetrics.
18. See Newman, supra note 7.
19. See Lara Grow & Nathaniel Grow, Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: Trade Secrets
in Professional Sports, 74 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1567, 1575 (2017) (explaining that Michael
Lewis’ 2003 best-selling book, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, highlighted the
successfully utilized statistical methods of Major League Baseball general manager Billy Beane of
the Oakland Athletics).
20. See Newman, supra note 7.
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competitive edge over opponents.21 Sports teams analyze and store non-
public information such as medical records, the extent of an injury, game
plans, internal communications, individual player performance metrics, and
biometric monitoring device data.22
Traditionally, sports organizations’ proprietary data has been shielded
from other organizations through trade secret laws, such as the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (USTA), the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), and the
Defend Trade Secrecy Act (DTSA).23 Principally, “a trade secret is legally
protected as long as its owner takes reasonable efforts, under the
circumstances, to protect the secret.”24 Thus, if the secret is reasonably
protected, the law “provides a remedy against a third party who
misappropriates that secret, such as by hacking into a server or hiring a
competitor’s employee to learn the secret.”25 The value of sports franchises’
proprietary information was on display in June 2015, when the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uncovered, after a yearlong investigation, that
St. Louis Cardinals’ scouting director Christopher Correa illegally hacked
into the internal computer network of the Houston Astros.26 Correa gained
access to the Astros’ scouting system, known as Ground Control, “in order
to view the team’s proprietary information (including Houston’s player
scouting reports and statistical analyses, in addition to the leaked trade-
discussion notes).”27 This case28 underscored the explosion of “computer-
driven analytics in baseball and other sports” as well as the increasingly
vital importance of proprietary data to professional teams in the industry.29
Correa pled guilty to five criminal counts of unauthorized access of a
protected computer, resulting in 46 months in prison and a court order to
21. See Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1577–78.
22. Biometric monitoring data includes sleep patterns, heart rate, body composition, nutrition
levels, etc. See Zachary Zagger, Sports Teams Must Tackle Hacking Risk Amid Legal Gambling,
LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1085391/sports-teams-must-tackle-
hacking-risk-amid-legal-gambling.
23. See Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1583.
24. ROGER ALLAN FORD, Trade Secrets and Information Security in the Age of Sports
Analytics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 491, 500–01 (Michael
McCann ed., 2018) (defining, generally, reasonable efforts as “teams should use strong
encryption, limit information access to employees with legitimate needs, use strong passwords and
two-factor authentication, log accesses, even keep especially sensitive information under physical
lock and key. Having employee policies that prohibit disclosure and requiring employees to sign
nondisclosure agreements likewise helps show that a team takes reasonable steps to maintain
secrecy.”).
25. Id. at 500.
26. See Tyler Kepner, Former Cardinals Executive Pleads Guilty to Hacking Astros, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/sports/baseball/former-cardinals-
executive-christopher-correa-pleads-guilty-to-hacking-astros.html?module=inline.
27. Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1580.
28. Plea Agreement, United States v. Christopher Correa, No. H-15-679 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8,
2016) (describing the charges to which Correa pled guilty and the punishment resulting).
29. Kepner, supra note 26.
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pay $279,038 in restitution.30 The severity of this sentence underscored the
importance of the stolen data and highlighted the need for sports
organizations “to take measures to secure and legally protect their most
valuable and sensitive information.”31
With the advent of legalized sports gambling in states and the value of
proprietary sports data, many industry members are deeply concerned about
cyberthreats of hackers looking to gain an edge in sports wagering using
non-public data.32 The integrity of the sports betting industry is at stake as
well as the integrity of the sports themselves.33 In both instances, fans of the
sport and those wagering on the sport place a considerable onus on
legitimate, untampered competition, and those within the industry exclaim
their “commitment to upholding integrity across all facets of a legal,
regulated sports betting market.”34 Compromised athlete privacy, extortion,
and money laundering are all problems that can accompany sports betting
when hackers unlawfully obtain nonpublic information to profit from
directly or sell to others.35 The substantial amounts of money and
participants soon to be associated with sports gambling activities create the
potential of an emerging “black market for data” utilized for sports
betting.36 There is genuine concern in the “potential for technology-
facilitated mischief of all types.”37 Although difficult to calculate, illegal
sports betting in the United States is estimated to fall between $150 billion
to $400 billion annually.38 The sports analytics market is anticipated to
reach $3.87 billion by 2022, an expected growth of 40.1% over six years.39
Teams are going to continue generating outrageous amounts of data. This
value and proliferation of data in sports provides “an opportunity for
sophisticated cybercriminals, who will inevitably seek to hack into
confidential sports information and use it to their advantage in placing legal
30. See Associated Press, Christopher Correa, Former Cardinals Executive, Sentenced to
Four Years for Hacking Astros’ Database, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/sports/baseball/christopher-correa-a-former-cardinals-
executive-sentenced-to-four-years-for-hacking-astros-database.html.
31. Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1580.
32. See Newman, supra note 7.
33. See Zagger, supra note 22.
34. Hilary Russ, First sports betting integrity group launched in United States, REUTERS
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-gambling-sports/first-sports-betting-
integrity-group-launched-in-united-states-idUSKCN1NW2MS.
35. See Newman, supra note 7; see also Zagger, supra note 22.
36. Zagger, supra note 22.
37. Id. (expressing the views of Edward J. McAndrew, co-leader of the privacy and data
security practice group at Ballard Spahr LLP).
38. See Newman, supra note 7.
39. See Business Wire, Worldwide Sports Analytics Market 2016-2022: Market to Grow by
Over 40% to an Aggregate of $3.97 Billion- Research and Markets, BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 12,
2017, 9:24 AM, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170112005616/en/Worldwide-
Sports-Analytics-Market-2016-2022-Market-Grow.
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sports bets. It is where cybercrime will no doubt meet insider trading in
sports.”40
II. SPORTS ANALYTICS DATA CATEGORIES
Professional sports have always used statistical data41 to measure
athlete performance and compare players. Currently, there are four
categories of sports data: (1) statistical data, (2) proprietary team analytics
data, (3) biometric data, and (4) medical and player injury data.
A. STATISTICALDATA
Major League Baseball (MLB) has been a pioneer in sports statistics
because of its early inception and the nature of the sport.42 There is an
inherent “one-on-one matchup between a batter and a pitcher[,]” which
results in either the success of the batter or the success of the pitcher.43 In
contrast, the other major sports in the United States (basketball, football,
and hockey) did not initially lend themselves to the proliferation of statistics
because “the performance of any one player on any particular play hinges to
a great extent not only on the performance of the player in question, but
also his or her interactions with four or more teammates working together
as a single unit on the playing field.”44 The value of statistical data has
exponentially grown with the advent of legalized sports gambling.45 The
debate on the collection method of game statistics stems from the insistence
of leagues, like the National Football League (NFL), to license “official
data” to the newly legalized betting establishments.46 Official data would be
“a league-approved tabulation of what happened in a sports competition” to
ensure accuracy and reliability.47 Some believe this is an effort for sports
leagues to get a direct cut of the legalized sports gambling industry.48
40. Newman, supra note 7.
41. For example, batting average, points per game, goals, shooting percentage, etc.
42. See Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1572–73.
43. Id. at 1572 (citing ROBERT E. KELLY, BASEBALL’S OFFENSIVE GREATS OF THE
DEADBALL ERA: BEST PRODUCERS RATED BY POSITION, 1901-19, 1 (McFarland & Co. ed.,
2009)) (“Of all sports, baseball is the easiest to quantify.”).
44. Id. at 1572–73. See FORD, supra note 24, at 494 (“Things become more complicated in
sports like basketball and football in which the data is more complex and player interactions
matter more.”).
45. See James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, When Sports Betting is Legal, the Value of Game
Data Soars, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/sports/sports-
betting.html.
46. See Moore, Post-PASPA, supra note 1, at 3–4.
47. Glanz & Armendariz, supra note 45.
48. Game statistical data is outside the scope of this Note, as this type of data is public
information. See id.
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B. TEAM PROPRIETARYADVANCED STATISTICAL ANDDATA
ANALYTICS
All four major North American sports leagues continue to utilize
advancing technology to create complex analytics models. For instance, the
NFL equipped all players’ shoulder pads with micro-computer chips to
constantly track players’ “location and movement.”49 Additionally, the
MLB StatCast system “not only records players’ every movement on the
field, but also tracks the flight of the baseball itself, including both the
number of times the ball rotates after being thrown by a pitcher, and the
velocity and angle with which it leaves the hitter’s bat.”50 With the
implementation of these data-gathering systems, this data presents “a
potentially significant source of competitive advantage for the teams that
are best able to develop proprietary methods for analyzing this new
information and incorporate it into their decision-making processes.”51
Sports franchises may use advanced analytics to enlighten more
traditional forms of proprietary information.52 For example, teams are
highly protective of playbooks containing strategies and plays; both hand
and verbal signals by coaches and teammates; scouting reports of strengths
and weakness of both their own players and opponents’ players; and
“records documenting prior and on-going trade negotiations with other
clubs.”53 The developments in technological sophistication of statistical and
data analytics place proprietary information as a sports team’s leading basis
for competitive advantage.54
C. ATHLETES’ BIOMETRICDATA
This subcategory of big sports data is not a new concept to athletes, but
the current application and implementation of biometric data is cutting
edge. “‘Biometric data’ is properly defined as measurements or records that
can be used to identify people as individuals; identifiers may be
physiological . . . or behavioral.”55 Therefore, vertical jump height, pitch
speed, heart rate, body composition, etc. are all forms of biometric data.
The latest innovations of wearable technology are used to optimize player
performance and safety with the ability to “gather one thousand data points
49. See Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1577.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1578 (stating that “firms continuously seek a competitive advantage over rivals”).
52. See id. at 1579.
53. Id.; see also Rice Ferrelle, Combating the Lure of Impropriety in Professional Sports
Industries: The Desirability of Treating a Playbook as a Legally Enforceable Trade Secret, 11 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 149, 150 (2003); Samuel J. Horovitz, If you Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying:
“Spygate” and the Legal Implications of Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 315–
16 (2009) (describing the lengths team will go to protect their playbooks).
54. See Grow & Grow, supra note 19, at 1579.
55. Barbara Osborne, Legal and Ethical Implications of Athletes’ Biometric Data Collection in
Professional Sport, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 37, 38 (2017).
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per second, per athlete.”56 Athlete biometric data is typically collected “to
monitor a player’s health, wellness, and performance; establish baselines,
perform diagnostics, understand player load, educate coaches and players
on the effects of training on players; and to design appropriate training and
recovery regimens” to prevent, monitor, and rehabilitate injury.57 Tatiana
Melnik, a healthcare lawyer, says, “There’s a huge benefit to the player . . .
they can get treated faster, and potential long-term damage can be
contained,” as a result of data collected from wearable technology.58
Presently, federal statutes are absent in regulating the collection of
biometric data, but in some contexts, state governments are acting to
regulate biometric data collection.59 Under the federal statutory framework
of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),60
some forms of biometric data are protected only “when collected by health
care providers.”61 Consequently, teams are responsible for self-regulating
astronomically large amounts of personal data.62
D. MEDICALDATA
HIPAA “compel[s] entities that deal with health information to comply
with certain privacy and security requirements.”63 Much of the medical staff
employed by professional sports teams could be considered healthcare
providers and thus are “subject to the privacy and security requirements of
HIPAA.”64 The Privacy Rule of HIPAA65 applies to “teams that submit a
bill, charge for a service, or transmit personal health information to an
insurance plan in an electronic format.”66 The Security Rule of HIPAA
similarly covers personal health information in electronic format only and
“requires entities to ensure physical, administrative (including risk analysis
56. Id.
57. See id. at 40.
58. Marc Tracy, With Wearable Tech Deals, New Player Data Is Up for Grabs, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/wearable-technology-
nike-privacy-college-football.html.
59. See Osborne, supra note 55, at 46; see also Gavin W. Skok, Washington State Passes Law
Restricting Commercial Collection, Storage and Use of Biometric Data, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
(June 8, 2017), https://dataprivacy.foxrothschild.com/2017/06/articles/privacy-rights/washington-
state-passes-law-restricting-commercial-use-of-biometric-data/ (noting that Washington joins
Illinois and Texas with a Biometric Information Privacy Act to “statutorily restrict the collection,
storage and use of biometric data for commercial purposes.”).
60. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 45 C.F.R. §
164.514(b) (2018) (listing identifiers of the individual that must be removed to achieve the “safe
harbor” method of de-identification. The statute highlights finger and voice prints.) [hereinafter
HIPAA].
61. See Osborne, supra note 55, at 46.
62. Id. at 46–47.
63. Id. at 51.
64. Id. at 52.
65. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2018) (describing the Privacy Rule of HIPAA).
66. Osborne, supra note 55, at 52.
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measures), and technical (including access and transmission) security
safeguards are in place for protecting [personal health information].”67
Additionally, and relevant to data security, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) created a Cybersecurity Framework in
2014 to supplement the HIPAA Security Rule and “identify potential gaps
in their programs.”68
III. NOTABLE HACKS AND DATA BREACHES IN SPORTS
Data breaches and hacks have become troublingly pervasive and
continue to increase in prevalence.69 Seemingly every day, there is another
announcement of a major hack with criminals escaping with millions of
sensitive records.70 Many prominent retailers, healthcare providers, social
media platforms, financial institutions, and the U.S. government have had
their data substantially compromised.71 The motives and methods of
corporate data breaches are wide-ranging,72 but it is clear that sports
organizations are similarly vulnerable, especially as the dependence on data
technology increases.73 As previously summarized, a motive centered on
gaining competitive advantage occurred when Christopher Correa, scouting
director of the St. Louis Cardinals, was sentenced to federal prison and
permanently banned from baseball for hacking into the Houston Astros
database.74 Again, this occasion demonstrates a major sports organization’s
failure to adhere to the basic cybersecurity practices of secure access and
password protocol. Below are examples of nefarious hacking situations in
the sporting world, emphasizing the increasing interplay between sports and
cyberspace.
67. Id. at 51; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018); see generally 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2018)
(describing the Security Rule of HIPAA).
68. HIPAA Security Rule Crosswalk to NIST Cybersecurity Framework, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF. FOR C.R. 1 (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov
/sites/default/files/nist-csf-to-hipaa-security-rule-crosswalk-02-22-2016-final.pdf (explaining the
HIPAA cybersecurity intersection with the NIST cybersecurity framework).
69. See Data Breaches Compromised 4.5 Billion Records in First Half of 2018, BUSINESS
WIRE, Oct. 9, 2018, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181008005322/en/ (noting a
report of “945 data breaches led to 4.5 billion data records being compromised worldwide in the
first half of 2018. Compared to the same period in 2017, the number of lost, stolen or
compromised records increased by a staggering 133 percent.”).
70. See MICHAEL CHERTOFF, EXPLODING DATA: RECLAIMING OUR CYBER SECURITY IN THE
DIGITALAGE 49 (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2018).
71. See Richie Birns, Alexander Southwell & Ben Arad, How a new defensive line can protect
sports properties, SPORTS BUS. J. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/Journal/Issues/2016/08/29/Opinion/From-the-Field-of-Cybersecurity.aspx?hl=breach.
72. See generally CHERTOFF, supra note 70 (analyzing these issues of method and motive
throughout the book).
73. See Birns, Southwell & Arad, supra note 71.
74. See Eric Fisher, Breaches highlight difficult task of keeping data secure, SPORTS BUS. J.
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/10/23/In-Depth/Data-
sidebar.aspx?hl=hacking (referencing summary in the introduction).
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A. HACKTIVIST INCIDENTS
A hacktivist incident is hacking a website or network to convey a
political or social message. There are four hacktivist incidents worth noting.
Firstly, in 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) hacked an English
rugby team’s website and the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) hacked FC
Barcelona’s Twitter account to “display their organizations’ extremist
messages.”75 Secondly, in 2015, there was an alleged hack of Tour de
France champion Chris Froome. The hacker attempted to access Froome’s
performance data to prove use of performance-enhancing drugs.76 Team
Sky alleged that hackers manipulated data to indicate that Froome was
doping.77 Thirdly, Fancy Bear, a Russian hacking organization, infiltrated
the World Anti-Doping Agency and released confidential athlete data for
the Rio 2016 Olympics, affecting forty-one athletes, thirteen countries, and
seventeen sports.78 Fancy Bear’s motivation for the hack, gleaned from
their website, was to “expos[e] the athletes who violate principles of fair
play by taking doping substances.”79 Fourthly, in April 2017, the
International Association of Athletics Federations suspected Fancy Bear of
hacking their records on “athletes’ therapeutic use exemption applications
which, if granted, allow athletes to use otherwise prohibited substances for
therapeutic purposes,” such as treating illnesses.80 Athletes, such as Simone
Biles and Serena Williams, had records stolen and released in an effort to
portray the United States, the athletes, and doping investigators as
hypocritical.81 Hacktivists inspired by any number of social motives, such
as anti-gambling or clean sport sentiment, may be inclined to carry out an
attack similar to these above.
75. Christopher LaVigne & Jeewon Kim Serrato, Hacking scandals highlight vulnerabilities
for teams and leagues, SPORTS BUS. J. (May 8, 2017), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.
com/Journal/Issues/2017/05/08/Opinion/From-the-Field.aspx. The tweet from SEA read, “Dear
FC Barcelona management, don’t let the Qatari money funds you, it’s full of blood and kill.”
James Orr, Barcelona Twitter account hacked by supports of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/barcelona-
twitter-account-hacked-by-supports-of-syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-9138237.html. FC
Barcelona’s uniform sponsor was Qatar Airways at the time, and the SEA hackers had extreme
hate for Qatar, as civil war in the Arabic region was occurring.
76. LaVigne & Serrato, supra note 79.
77. These allegations were linked to Fancy Bear. See Marissa Payne, Team Sky alleges hacker
stole data to frame Tour de France leader Chris Froome for doping, WASH. POST (July 14, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/07/14/team-sky-alleges-hackers-stole-
data-to-frame-tour-de-france-leader-chris-froome-for-doping/?utm_term=.3e870b7dea3b.
78. See World Anti-Doping Agency, Cyber Hack Update: Data Leak Concerning 41 athletes
from 13 countries and 17 sports, WADA (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/media/news/2016-09/cyber-hack-update-data-leak-concerning-41-athletes-from-13-
countries-and-17.
79. See LaVigne & Serrato, supra note 79.
80. Id.
81. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, U.S. Says Russians Were Behind Cyberattacks on Antidoping
Agency, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/sports/russia-
cyberattacks-wada-doping.html.
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B. POORCYBERSECURITY PRACTICES
Basic quality cyberhealth and cybersecurity practices are foundational
to any industry. These incidents underscore the need for basic, prudential
protocols and practices in the sporting context. Employee negligence and
lack of training are common sources of system breaches. Firstly, in 2016,
the Milwaukee Bucks were victims of a phishing scam resulting in the
release of tax information, including Social Security numbers and total
compensation packages, of all its employees and players.82 An unknown
party, impersonating Bucks President Peter Feigin using a “spoofed
email address,” requested the tax information from a Bucks employee.83
It took approximately three weeks to discover the breach.84 The Bucks
launched an investigation, notified those impacted, and provided
additional privacy training to its staff.85 An agent of a Bucks player
pointedly said, “The communication received on this major security
breach is unacceptable . . . [T]here needs to be accountability for such a
mistake, details on the steps taken to rectify it and a process put in place
to make sure this never happens again.”86 The second incident was an
athletic trainer for the Washington Redskins had his laptop stolen from his
car in 2017. The computer possessed medical records of players and
prospective players from the NFL combine. The Redskins had password
protected computers but failed to encrypt their hardware.87 After this
incident, all “teams have been directed to re-confirm that they have
reviewed their internal data protection and privacy policies and that . . .
every person with access to medical information has reviewed and received
training on the policies regarding privacy and security of that
information.”88
The following two incidents were careless accidents by professional
sports leagues in securing their players’ data. Major League Lacrosse
(MLL) accidentally leaked more than 1,000 players’ confidential
information.89 The league supposedly used an Excel spreadsheet listing
personal identifying information.90 The MLL received heavy criticism for
82. See LaVigne & Serrato, supra note 79.
83. See id.
84. See Post Wire Report, Hacker stole the Bucks’ financial info using oldest trick in the book,
N.Y. POST (May 20, 2016), https://nypost.com/2016/05/20/hacker-stole-the-bucks-financial-info-
using-oldest-trick-in-the-book/.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. John Keim, Stolen laptop of Redskins trainer contained players’ medical info, ESPN (June
2, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/15884597/laptop-stolen-washington-redskins-
trainer-contained-medical-records-thousands-nfl-players.
88. Id.
89. See Fisher, supra note 74.
90. Daniel Rapaport, Major League Lacrosse Accidentally Released Its Players’ Social
Security Numbers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.si.com/more-
sports/2017/08/29/major-league-lacrosse (listing information as “full name, address, telephone
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neither encrypting nor password-protecting the information upon the
request of the MLL Players’ Council and the players.91 Furthermore, the
MLL failed to promptly inform those impacted by the incident.92 However,
when informed via email, there were instructions to protect their credit and
how to file a complaint with the FTC.93 The National Football League
Players Association’s (NFLPA) database accidentally exposed information
of more than 1,100 players and agents.94 Kromtech Security, a
cybersecurity company, came “across an open Elasticsearch database [a
search engine of sorts] sitting on a server for NFLPA.com.”95 In other
words, all the data inside this Elasticsearch database was accessible and
compromised to anyone who knew the link.96 Hackers who found the
database attempted to use ransomware to lock up the database and
threatened to release the information to the public unless given a bitcoin
payment.97 In all of these situations, there was a lack of common sense
awareness that needs to be addressed industry wide, and sports betting
legislation can begin to tackle basic aspects of cybersecurity.98
C. CYBERATTACK IN SPORTSBETTING
DraftKings Inc., a major daily fantasy sports and sports book operator,
was attacked in August 2018.99 DraftKings filed a suit against unidentified
cyberattackers100 in hopes to discover those responsible for “intentionally
sen[ding] thousands of packets of information or commands to
[DraftKings’] website with the intent of damaging and negatively impacting
[DraftKings] and its operations.”101 The attacks, which occurred twice in
number, email address, Social Security number, citizenship, date of birth, height, weight, position,
college, graduation year, team, and non-MLL occupation of each player in its player pool.”).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. No information was reported regarding formal FTC involvement. See id.
94. See Fisher, supra note 74.
95. Thomas Brewster, 1,200 Football Players’ Personal Data Exposed In NFL Leak - Colin
Kaepernick Included, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster
/2017/10/03/colin-kaepernick-nfl-data-leaked-hackers-ransomware-threat/#7b51d9681767.
96. See id.
97. Fortunately, the data breach did not include Social Security numbers or financial
information, but the breach did include “players’ home addresses, mobile numbers, email
addresses, colleges, dates of birth and agent fees. . . .” See id.
98. The Cleveland Cavaliers announced official cybersecurity partnership with TrustedSec, a
company that provides security through “cyber security tests, hacking simulations, security
audits.” TrustedSec will act to protect public WIFI in the arena. Kenny Honaker, Cavs add
TrustedSec as ‘Official Cyber Security Partner’, CAVS NATION (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://cavsnation.com/cavs-news-cleveland-adds-trustedsec-official-cyber-security-partner/.
99. See Chris Villani, DraftKings Files Suit To Unmask Perps In Cyberattack, LAW360 (Aug.
31, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1078612/draftkings-files-suit-to-unmask-perps-in-
cyberattack.
100. See DraftKings Inc. v. John Does #1-10, Docket No. 1:18-cv-11869 (D. Mass. Aug. 30,
2018).
101. Villani, supra note 99.
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August 2018, inundated the website with “a three-fold increase of requests
per second,” which stifled the ability of legitimate users to participate in
website functions.102 DraftKings filed suit in the U.S. District Court of
Massachusetts pursuing the identity and retribution of the responsible
party.103
These information breaches and attacks on sports organizations denote
fundamental shortcomings that leave these organizations glaringly
vulnerable.104 Much of the effort and money of generating progressively
secretive and complex data analytic methods is done in-house;105 therefore,
sports teams and leagues are valuable targets of cybercriminals, namely
gamblers, mining for confidential information.106 The value of sports data
in a burgeoning gambling industry increases the motivation for hackers to
exploit sports organizations.
IV. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES: DATA PROTECTION AND
CYBERSECURITY SOLUTIONS
As professional sports continues to reinforce secretive tendencies with
data and analytics usage, it resembles other similarly guarded industries like
Wall Street.107 “[S]ecurity breaches and industrial espionage” have also
infiltrated the sports industry, similar to the retail or social media
industries.108 In the midst of a data explosion, those entities involved in
United States based professional and amateur sports must heed lessons from
the FTC on cybersecurity and missteps of company data protection.109 The
sporting industry must place “heightened cybersecurity safeguards into
place now to protect confidential sports information.”110 Much of the sports
gambling regulatory debates involve the social implication of gambling
addiction and match-fixing, but the cybersecurity/hacking risk is a serious
concern that regulators must not neglect.111
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See generally LaVigne & Serrato, supra note 79 (highlighting teams and leagues
vulnerabilities, often to basic cybersecurity demands).
105. See FORD, supra note 24, at 491.
106. See LaVigne & Serrato, supra note 79.
107. In both Wall Street banking and sports, data information is being vehemently guarded by
the executives in order to remedy inefficiencies and gain advantages. See Moore, supra note 16;
see also FORD, supra note 24, at 491.
108. See FORD, supra note 24, at 491.
109. See ANDREA M. MATWYSHYN, HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND
THE CORPORATION 243–44 n. 53 (Stanford Univ. Press 2009).
110. Craig A. Newman, Sports Data & Cybercrime: Alarm Bells?, PATTERSON BELKNAP (Sept.
26, 2018), https://www.pbwt.com/data-security-law-blog/sports-data-cybercrime-alarm-bells/.
111. See Zagger, supra note; see generally Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in
America Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the
H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (statements of Les Bernal, National Director of
Stop Predatory Gambling), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20180927/108721/HHRG-
115-JU08-Wstate-BernalL-20180927.pdf (addressing the addictive nature of government-
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A. CURRENT LEGALREMEDIESALONEARE INSUFFICIENT
There are many rules and laws in place to protect a team’s secrets and
data, however, these legal remedies are sometimes “effectively
worthless.”112 Trade secret laws,113 paired with nondisclosure and
noncompete contracts for employees, protect a wide variety of
information.114 Yet, there remain disadvantages in these methods of
protection. For example, “preventing an employee from going to work for a
competitor is far more disruptive than prohibiting her from disclosing
secrets, since it can affect her basic livelihood.”115 When obtaining a
noncompete agreement, employers may have to provide additional
consideration to compensate the employee for future losses in income as a
result of the noncompete.116 Finally, “in many cases, obtaining a
noncompete agreement may be impossible, since some states ban them
outright or significantly limit their scope.”117 In a dynamic internet and data
analytics industry, noncompete agreements are likely to be short in duration
because technology is rapidly evolving.118 The professional sports industry
is comparatively small, thus limiting options for professional growth if
encumbered by strict noncompete clauses.119
When league or team secrets/data are unduly taken, other legal
remedies exist within criminal law. For example, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA)120 is useful for obtaining confidential information
involving unauthorized access of a computer.121 The statutory requirement
sanctioned gambling and the financial losses Americans are expected to endure with legalized
sports gambling) [hereinafter Bernal: Post-PASPA]; see generally Post-PASPA: An Examination
of Sports Betting in America Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and
Investigations of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (statements of Jon Bruning,
Counselor of Coalition to Stop Online Gambling), https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Bruning-Testimony.pdf (addressing the addictive social implication of
online gambling and the shortcomings of laws applying to online gambling activity) [hereinafter
Bruning: Post-PASPA].
112. See FORD, supra note 24, at 504.
113. Trade secret law was discussed in Section I: The Explosion of Valuable Sports Data of this
Note. See discussion supra Section I; see also FORD, supra note 24, at 504 (noting that “trade
secrecy protects only against wrongful misappropriation by another. If someone obtains the exact
same information through legitimate means, then there’s no problem.”).
114. See FORD, supra note 24, at 498 (defining the difference between nondisclosure
agreements and noncompete agreements, noting that “nondisclosure agreements prohibit signers
from disclosing covered information to third parties, while noncompete agreements prohibit a
team’s employees from working for the competitor for a fixed period after leaving the team.”).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See ANN C. HODGES & RAFAEL GREY, Noncompetition Covenants, PRINCIPLES OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW 166, 167 (2nd ed. 2018); Steve Lohr, To Compete Better, States Are Trying to
Curb Noncompete Pacts, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/06/29/technology/to-compete-better-states-are-trying-to-curb-noncompete-pacts.html.
119. See FORD, supra note 24, at 498–99.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
121. See FORD, supra note 24, at 503.
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of computer access “without authorization” is contentious and has led to
ambiguity in interpretation.122 This remedy is likely useful in many
circumstances due to professional teams’ dependence “on networked
computers and data to operate.”123 Additional criminal law remedies
include mail-fraud and wire-fraud statutes “ban[ning] the use of the mail or
most telecommunications services to commit fraud or obtain another’s
property or money.”124 In Murphy, the Supreme Court did not alter the
applicability of the federal Interstate Wire Act of 1961 and referred to the
previously established “safe harbor” exception in transmitting sports
wagering information between jurisdictions where sports wagering is
lawful.125
Criminal laws can be a powerful tool as both deterrents and remedies to
data breaches and stealing confidential information. However, criminal
investigations and the prosecution of alleged misconduct are executed by
“law enforcement agents and prosecutors instead of private lawyers” and
“teams must give up a lot of control,” especially with requirements to
cooperate with investigations by divulging secrets and algorithms.126
Essentially, the best practice is preventing the taking of secrets and
preventing data breaches from occurring by thorough effective information-
security on both technical and human factors.127
B. COMBATHACKING THROUGH FEDERALLYGUIDED STANDARDS
A federal regulatory scheme for the sports gambling market must
provide laws that incentivize the privately owned and operated companies
122. See id. (highlighting the debate over the definition of “without authorization”). One
example of this is “if a team employee violated team policies to download data to a personal flash
drive, and only later provided that data to a rival team, it might or might not count as unauthorized
access since physical access to the computer was authorized but the scope of the access was not.”
Id. This example displays a narrow interpretation of the CFAA “maintain[ing] that the prohibition
only refers to information within a system that an insider does not have explicit authorization to
access,” but the “broad interpretation camps maintain that exceeding authorized access refers not
just to the situations discussed above, but also to situations in which an employee accesses
information that she is authorized to access but does so for the purposes that violate her
authorization.” Kevin Jakopchek, “Obtaining” the Right Result: A Novel Interpretation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act That Provides Liability for Insider Theft Without Overbreadth,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 605, 632 (2014).
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2008)).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (a)–(b) (2012); see also Mark A. Clayton & Erica L. Okerberg, The
Wire Act and Interstate Sports Wagering Post-Murphy, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP ALERT:
GAMING (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2018/9/the-wire-act-and-interstate-
sports-wagering-post-murphy.
126. FORD, supra note 24, at 504. Additionally, the cybersecurity laws in the U.S. are “an
uncoordinated mishmash of requirements that mostly were conceived long before modern cyber-
threats. . . stem[ming] from century old privacy norms, torts, and criminal laws that bear little
relation to protection of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems, networks, and
data.” Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 988 (2018).
127. See FORD, supra note 24, at 504.
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“to collaborate with the government in protecting against shared
vulnerabilities.”128 Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and data
security are largely private.129 The internet creates an interdependence, or a
joint venture, for effective data security of similarly situated entities within
an industry.130 “Without government expertise and even regulation, coupled
with private sector ingenuity and commitment, the internet infrastructure
will continue to fall prey to its weakest links.”131 President Obama signed
an Executive Order in 2015 in an effort to promote private sector
cybersecurity information sharing.132 The intent of Information Sharing and
Analysis Organizations (ISAO) was to facilitate the sharing of “information
related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and collaborate to respond in as
close to real time as possible.”133 It is critical that regulation in the sports
gambling industry clearly promote and directly guard information sharing
among all entities involved as seen in other areas of the private sector.134
Currently, ISAOs service information sharing through Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC). These ISACs are typically operated
through a sector-based model, “meaning that organizations within a certain
sector135 join together to share information about cyber threats.”136
Cooperation across states, sports teams, and leagues is “important so that as
large a slice of the market as possible can be monitored.”137
Action has been taken to establish the Sports Wagering Integrity
Monitoring Association (SWIMA), a nonprofit overseer to detect fraud as
sports betting evolves.138 This association would essentially function in the
same way as an ISAO “that would share betting information in an effort to
identify suspicious activity aimed at compromising sporting events.”139 The
American Gaming Association, a “group that represents the casino industry,
128. CHERTOFF, supra note 70, at 206.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See U.S. Exec. Order No. 13691 (Feb. 13, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-
shari (describing the specific methods for sharing cybersecurity information in the private sector).
133. Id.
134. CHERTOFF, supra note 70, at 206.
135. For example, financial services, energy, aviation, etc.
136. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), HOMELAND SEC. (May 21,
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/isao.
137. Scott Schectman & Tony Sio, Why America Should Embrace Market Surveillance in
Sports Betting Before It’s Too Late, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/09/20/business/dealbook/why-america-should-embrace-market-surveillance-in-sports-
betting-before-its-too-late.html.
138. See Jeannie O’Sullivan, Ex-NJ Asst. AG Joins New Sports Betting Watchdog, LAW360
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1105626/ex-nj-asst-ag-joins-new-sports-
betting-watchdog.
139. Ryan Rodenberg, ‘Integrity monitoring association’ for sports betting under
consideration, ESPN (Sept. 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24742199/integrity-
monitoring-association-sports-betting-consideration.
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said it is collaborating on a ‘robust suspicious information sharing
repository.’”140 Sports leagues, including the Professional Golfers’
Association (PGA), have stated a federal requirement is needed so that an
all-inclusive approach to information sharing provides the greatest benefit
to sports integrity.141 In a 2007 joint letter to Congress from NFL, NBA,
MLB, National Hockey League (NHL), and National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) attorneys, they wrote, “[W]e have heard the argument
that Internet gambling can actually protect the integrity of sports because of
the alleged capacity to monitor gambling patterns more closely in a
legalized environment.”142 Federal intervention in the form of mandating
centralized committees or associations will help foster transparency
between sports leagues, regulators, and betting providers.143 In the case of
SWIMA, the organization is funded by the gambling industry as opposed to
government funds, but it is a collaborative effort among regulators, law
enforcement, and stakeholders “to detect and discourage fraud and other
illegal or unethical activity related to betting on sporting events.”144
SWIMA realizes that federal law enforcement and resources are integral to
the success of this watchdog organization.145
C. PROPER SURVEILLANCE AND THEROLE OF THE FTC
Fast-forward to the 2000s financial markets where “[m]any investors,
regulators, and capital market players were caught flat-footed when markets
were computerized decades ago.”146 The financial industry was not
sufficiently prepared for the digital age and the difficulty of tracking trading
methods “within a sea of data.”147 In both the 1930s and the early 2000s,
“the cost to the financial industry of catching up with the bad behavior was
significantly higher than if it had invested in defensive technologies at the
start.”148 Fortunately, now the systems tasked with surveilling the financial
markets have a tremendous capacity for data, which aids in immediately
detecting suspicious activity.149 These types of systems will be critical for
policing the sports gambling market, particularly real-time, in-game betting
(prop bets).150 With growth in the quantity of data and cunningness of
gamblers, regulators and enforcement agents would be prudent to learn
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. O’Sullivan, supra note 138.
145. See id.
146. Schectman & Sio, supra note 137.
147. See id.
148. Id. (estimating implementation of the Consolidated Audit Trail cost the financial industry
over $50 million in its first year).
149. See id.
150. See id.
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lessons from advancements in the monitoring of the securities market.151
Many risks can now be identified because of similarities to the securities
exchange.152 The security market, like the sports market, exist on a national
level, and therefore state regulation alone is inadequate.153 A federal
framework provides the sports gambling industry a greater chance of
staving off an industry equivalent to a stock market crash.
The FTC’s purpose is “advancing consumer interests while encouraging
innovation and competition in our dynamic economy.”154 Additionally, the
FTC collaborates with domestic and international law enforcement agencies
and organizations to protect consumers.155 In the FTC’s quest to stop
“unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices in the marketplace,” it has
regulatory, investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative powers under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.156 The FTC specializes in data security and
privacy measures in the marketplace.157 The FTC puts forth
suggestions/guidelines for data security within companies and has “deemed
the reach of its powers to prevent unfairness and deception under Section 5
of the FTC Act to include issues of information security promises made to
consumers.”158 The FTC has filed many complaints under the unfairness
prong of the FTC Act § 45(a), and the Third Circuit decision in FTC v.
Wyndham reaffirmed the FTC’s expansive enforcement authority in United
States corporate privacy and security.159 Following this case in 2015, the
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramierz stated, “It is not only appropriate, but
critical, that the FTC has the ability to take action on behalf of consumers
when companies fail to take reasonable steps to secure sensitive consumer
information.”160
Many cases settle when the FTC brings an action under FTC Act 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) prohibiting “unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”161 Thus, there are limited judicial interpretations of
151. See id.
152. Schectman & Sio, supra note 137.
153. See Keith C. Miller & Anthony N. Cabot, Regulatory Models for Sports Wagering: The
Debate Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLVGAMING L.J. 153, 174 (2018).
154. What We Do, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 28, 2018)
[hereinafter FTC: What We Do]
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See ANDREW B. SERWIN ET AL., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT AND ENFORCEMENT
UNDER THE FTC ACT, PRIVACY, SECURITY AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
421 (ABA 2011).
158. Matwyshyn, supra note 109, at 243–244.
159. See Press Release, FTC, Statement from FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez on Appellate
Ruling in the Wyndham Hotels and Resorts Matter (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/08/statement-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-appellate-ruling-
wyndham.
160. Id.
161. Gerald J. Ferguson & Alan L. Friel, Challenging FTC Regulation of Cyber-security After
FTC v. Wyndham, BAKER HOSTETLER: DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2015),
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the statute.162 Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s computer systems were
hacked on three separate occurrences within one year.163 Personal and
financial information of many thousands of consumers was stolen, and
Wyndham’s inadequate data security resulted in $10.6 million in fraudulent
charges.164 The Third Circuit affirmed that “Wyndham engaged in unfair
cybersecurity practice that, ‘taken together, unreasonably and unnecessarily
exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and theft.”165 This
decision effectively puts companies on notice to meet certain baseline
privacy and security standards set by Wyndham.166 This case does not
provide a bright-line rule on minimum adequate cybersecurity practice;
therefore, each company must align their policies and practices with the
“risks given the varieties of industries, customers, vendors, markets, and
regulations.”167
V. SPORTS GAMBLING ANALOGIZED TO SECURITY
EXCHANGE
A. EFFECTIVE SIMILARITIES
In certain parts of the world,168 the sports gambling scene resembles the
trading floor of the New York Stock Exchange.169 There are monitors with
live data feeds to facilitate “in-play wagering.”170 The sports gambling
industry in the United States should adopt more than just the atmosphere of
the Securities Exchange.171 Sports wagering and securities regulation both
“concern the regulation of exchanges involving contracts where the
purchaser/bettor is attempting to earn profits based on a future contingent
event.”172 In both markets, developing laws and strict regulation would
serve to curtail insiders, including those who nefariously possess insider
information, from acting (trading or betting) on that information not
available to the investing or betting public.173 The SEC was created “to
restore investor confidence in our capital markets by providing investors
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/cybersecurity/challenging-ftc-regulation-of-cyber-security-
after-ftc-v-wyndham/.
162. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. See David Adler, FTC v. Wyndham and corporate cybersecurity, CIO FROM IDG (Sept. 1,
2016), https://www.cio.com/article/3110012/security/ftc-v-wyndham-and-corporate-
cybersecurity.html.
167. Id.
168. For example, Europe, Asia, and Australia. See Schectman & Sio, supra note 137.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Miller & Cabot, supra note 153, at 173.
173. See id.
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and the markets with more reliable information and clear rules of honest
dealing.” The SEC had to restore investor confidence after state government
regulatory schemes proved ineffective, since “stock promoters complied
only with the laws of the states with the least regulation or the most
corruption and used that as a basis for offering the stocks on a national
basis.”174 The states were only willing to concede regulatory power after the
stock market crash in 1929.175 Thus, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
established the SEC with the purpose “to eliminate the idea that use of
inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of
corporate office.”176 The sports betting industry possesses similar needs of
deterrence and protection against betting on insider information.
B. TREATMENT OFOUTSIDER TRADING BY THE SEC
Throughout this discussion, there have been references to insider,
confidential, trade secret, and non-public information. The act of
cybercriminals taking confidential team or league information and betting
on this information is most analogous to outsider trading, a form of insider
trading on securities where the individual does not have a fiduciary duty to
investors. The conventional ideas of insider trading must be established in
order to analyze the SEC’s treatment of outsider trading.
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 addresses
insider trading by allowing shareholders to sue officers, directors, or
shareholders “to recover any short-swing profits gained by the purchase and
sale, or sale and purchase, of any equity security in the company occurring
within six months of each other.”177 Section 16(b)’s purpose is to “prevent
[] the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such
beneficial owner, director or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer.”178 Insider trading violations are governed by Rule 10(b)-5, which
prohibits fraud or misrepresentation in securities transactions.179
Furthermore, Rule 10(b)-5 has three provisions for the purchase or sale of a
security: (a) prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud;”180 (b) prohibits material misstatements and omissions;181 (c)
prohibits engaging in “any act, practice, or course of business which
174. Id. at 174.
175. See id.
176. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n. 10 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC
907, 912 n. 15 (1961)).
177. Adam R. Nelson, Extending Outsider Trading Liability to Thieves, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2157, 2163 (2012).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
179. See John Reed Stark, Inside The SEC’s Outsider Trading Program: Part 1, LAW360 (Oct.
29, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1096312/inside-the-sec-s-outsider-trading-program-
part-1.
180. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2011).
181. See Nelson, supra note 177, at 2165 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)).
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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”182 Section 10(b) and
Rule 10(b)-5 are “not intended as a specification of particular acts or
practices that constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others.”183 This language set the stage for a slowly developed
“judicially created concoction” prohibiting insider trading.184
The classical theory of insider trading states that insiders must either
disclose or abstain from trading on material non-public information lest that
insider be liable for fraud.185 This classical theory only imposes a fiduciary
duty on shareholders and their tippees.186 Additionally, misappropriation
theory, an expansion of classical theory, “extended liability from insiders,
to outsiders who receive tips from insiders, to outsiders who owe a duty to
the source of the information.”187 In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court “stated
that the misappropriation theory . . . was intended to target outsiders
without a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the company in whose securities
they traded”188 and created a “duty of trust and confidence” to the source of
the information.189 This judicial expansion was an effort to ensure honest
markets and investor confidence. The Court determined the alternative
would be unworkable and opined “permitting unchecked use of
misappropriated information would permit certain individuals to gain an
informational advantage that other parties could not overcome through
research and would cause investors to either refuse to participate in the
market, or discount securities.”190 The concern expressed here is one of
legitimacy for sports betting, since participants are less likely to partake in a
unfair enterprise.
From 2005 to 2016, the SEC staff greatly prioritized the targeting of the
outsider thief breaking “through a virtual window, in cyberspace” and
“reasoning that hack-and-trade cyber thieves were masquerading as
company insiders and were therefore committing securities fraud.”191 The
SEC brought enforcement actions against individuals who had no
182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
183. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961).
184. Stark, supra note 179.
185. See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, Practitioner Note: The Law of Insider Trading:
Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U J. L. &
BUS. 151, 160 (2011).
186. See Nelson, supra note 177, at 2178.
187. Id. at 2192 (expanding on classical theory in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Chiarella
and the Supreme Court opinions of Carpenter and O’Hagan).
188. Id. at 2185 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997)).
189. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1997) (explaining that the defendant
misappropriated the non-public information to purchase securities).
190. Nelson, supra note 177, 2180–81 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59
(1997)).
191. Stark, supra note 179.
2019] On the Clock, Best Bet to Draft Cyberdefensive Linemen 561
relationship to the source of the information other than gaining or stealing
material non-public information and trading securities based on this
information.192 Within this ten year period, the SEC enforcement action
highlighted the pervasive threat from sophisticated hackers of confidential
information, which may preview similarly nefarious acts to come in the
sports betting world.
Two outsider trading cases especially display the parallel cybersecurity
issues posed in the securities market and the sports betting market. In 2008,
SEC v. Oleksandr Dorozhko became the seminal case in the extension of
outsider trading liability.193 Dorozhko opened an online trading account and
deposited $42,500, then with this money he purchased $41,670.90 in put
options of IMS Health Inc. stock.194 Shortly after, IMS announced their
earnings were 28% below third quarter expected earnings.195 Thus, the next
morning the stock dropped severely, and Dorozhko sold all his put options
for a $286,000 profit.196 The SEC managed to uncover that Dorozhko had
hacked the earnings report before its release.197 He had repeatedly
attempted to hack the Thomsen Financial Inc. server, the web-hosting
service for IMS earnings reports.198 Dorozhko successfully hacked the
server, located the report, and downloaded the non-public information.199
Interactive Brokers, the online trading company used for the purchase of put
options, informed the SEC of irregular trading activity and they were able
to trace the activity to Dorozhko’s IP address.200 The Southern District
Court of New York refused to extend securities fraud liability on Dorzohko
because precedent in Chiarella and O’Hagan maintained that “insider
trading was premised on a fiduciary or similar duty to disclose or
abstain.”201
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court vacated the Southern
District Court of New York decision stating that the lower court
misinterpreted precedent and Dorozhko satisfies § 10(b)’s requirement of
deception or contrivance.202 Furthermore, the Court opined that “what is
sufficient is not always what is necessary, and none of the Supreme Court
opinions considered by the District Court require fiduciary relationship as
192. See Nelson, supra note 177, at 2182.
193. See Stark, supra note 179.
194. See Nelson, supra note 177, at 2183.
195. See Stark, supra note 179.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Nelson, supra note 177, at 2183.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2183–84.
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an element of an actionable securities claim under Section 10(b).”203 By
Dorozhko misrepresenting himself in stealing the information, the Court
determined this was a deceptive device sufficient for outsider trading
liability.204
About eight years after Dorozhko, in 2015, the SEC charged thirty-two
defendants with fraud in a cyberhacking scheme of news releases.205 The
SEC charged two Ukrainian men, Ivan Turchynov and Oleksandr
Ieremenko, of leading a hacking scheme of newswire services to steal
hundreds of earnings announcements before the data was released to the
public.206 Over a five year span, the defendants procured over $100 million
in profits by illegally trading on and disseminating stolen data.207 The SEC
investigation discovered Turchynov and Ieremenko relayed the hacked data,
for a price, to traders in Russia, Ukraine, Malta, Cyprus, France, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Georgia.208 Specifically, the defendants used “proxy
servers to mask their identities and by posing as newswire service
employees and customers,” and they advertised their hacking ability via
video to recruit and elicit payments from traders for their services.209 The
authorities have yet to locate Turchynov and Ieremenko, but many of those
involved have incurred civil liability for securities fraud and plead guilty to
criminal counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit
computer hacking, and aggravated identity theft.210 According to the former
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, the SEC’s “use of
innovative analytical tools to find suspicious trading patterns and expose
misconduct demonstrates that no trading scheme is beyond our ability to
unwind.”211 There are a number of other hacking incidents involving
trading of securities and the SEC, including a Chinese hacking scheme in
2016 and the hack of the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval
system (EDGAR) in 2017.212
203. Nelson, supra note 177, at 2183–84 (quoting SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir.
2009)); see SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated by SEC v.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
204. See Stark, supra note 179.
205. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges 32 Defendants in Scheme to Trade on Hacked News
Releases (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-163.html.
206. See Stark, supra note 179.
207. See Press Release, supra note 205.
208. See id.
209. Id.
210. See Press Release, The U.S. Att’y’s Off. District of N.J., Hacker Sentenced to 30 Months
In Prison for Role in Largest Known Computer Hacking and Securities Fraud Scheme (May 22,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/hacker-sentenced-30-months-prison-role-largest-
known-computer-hacking-and-securities.
211. Press Release, supra note 205 (quoting Andrew Ceresney, the former Director of the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement).
212. See Stark, supra note 179.
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C. GOVERNMENTAGENCY’SCOMMITMENT ANDRESOURCES TO
CYBERSECURITY
Government agencies, such as the SEC and FTC, are the fiduciary of
the American taxpayer and work “on behalf of the American people.”213
Federal legislation, including the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996,214 the E-
Government Act of 2002,215 and the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002,216 “involves both securing federal systems and
fulfilling the appropriate federal role in protecting nonfederal systems.”217
A 2017 Executive Order stated that it will hold agency heads responsible
and “accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises.”218
The President of the United States will hold these agency heads responsible
for implementing the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity developed by NIST.219 The items and procedures outlined in
the Executive Order are instituted, “to ensure the internet remain valuable
for future generations . . .” and “to promote open, interoperable, reliable,
and secure internet that fosters efficiency, innovation, communication, and
economic prosperity, while respecting privacy and guarding against
disruption, fraud, and theft.”220 The federal government agencies are
hyperaware of the cybersecurity issues and hold a legislatively mandated
high standard of responsibility.221 The Executive Branch of the Federal
Government is using its authority and capabilities to support cybersecurity
risk management.
213. See U.S. Exec. Order No. 13800 (May 11, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-
critical-infrastructure/.
214. “The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 made agency heads responsible for ensuring the adequacy
of agency information-security policies and procedures, established the chief information officer
(CIO) position in agencies, and gave the Secretary of Commerce authority to make promulgated
security standards mandatory.” ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL
LAWS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 2 (2014).
215. “The E-Government Act of 2002 serves as the primary legislative vehicle to guide federal
IT management and initiatives to make information and services available online and includes
various cybersecurity requirements.” Id.
216. “The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) clarified and
strengthened NIST and agency cybersecurity responsibilities, established a central federal incident
center, and made OMB, rather than the Secretary of Commerce, responsible for promulgating
federal cybersecurity standards.” Id.
217. Id.
218. U.S. Exec. Order No. 13800, supra note 213.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. See generally Fisher, supra note 214 (outlining the current statutes pertaining to
cybersecurity in government agencies).
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VI. STATE REGULATORY ADVOCATES
State gambling regulators have taken a firm stance against federal
oversight since PASPA was deemed unconstitutional.222 Proponents of
individual state regulation of sports gambling rely on gaming laws
historically belonging within the purview of states’ rights.223 State lotteries,
casino games, and sports gambling have different levels of chance and
skill.224 In 2015, the Borgata Casino hosted the first ‘Free Throw Basketball
Tournament,’ where participants wagered on their ability to make foul shots
in a highly regulated competition with over forty rules listed.225 If they were
to bet on other shooters or professional basketball players’ foul shots, then
information about the competitors gives some participants a distinct
advantage. The human factor and the flow of information, especially with
the use of technology, takes sports gambling into a different sphere than
what states traditionally regulate. With increased skill and decreased
chance, the external factors escalate, making regulation responsibilities
more complex.
In a statement signed by four state gaming commissioners, the concern
is that integrity fees and federal oversight would “increase the costs of legal
sports betting [and] siphon much-needed tax revenues away from state
coffers.”226 Furthermore, advocates of state regulatory control push to
emulate the decades of experience that Nevada provides from legalized
sports betting. The Chair of the Nevada Gaming Control Board outlined
Nevada’s critical legal regulation concerns: (1) integrity in gaming, (2) the
impact of reasonable tax rates and fee structures, (3) combatting illegal
operators is a perpetual reality, (4) sports wagering technology of the
highest quality, and (5) issues of gambling addiction.227 States can improve
on or adopt the Nevada regulatory model. Essentially, states would be
regulatory “‘laboratories’ for other states to learn from.”228 Additionally,
222. See James Glanz, States Are Pushing to Keep Federal Regulation Out of Sports Gambling,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/sports/sports-gambling-
regulation.html.
223. See id.
224. See Eric Chemi, Skill, chance, gambling, legality: They’re all separate, CNBC: THE BIG
CRUNCH WITH ERIC CHEMI (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/12/skill-chance-
gambling-legality-theyre-all-separate.html.
225. See id.
226. Glanz, supra note 222. Integrity fees are the sports leagues taxing a percentage of each bet
placed in which their league is implicated in the bet. This fee is then used to maintain the integrity
of the sport.
227. See generally Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary, 115th Congr. (2018) (statement of Becky Harris, Chair, Nevada Gaming Control),
https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Chairwoman-Becky-
Harris.pdf (outlining several concerns regarding the regulation of legalized sports betting)
[hereinafter Harris: Post-PASPA]
228. Miller & Cabot, supra note 153, at 164.
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states argue regulatory autonomy enables “a sports wagering system that
fit[s] their own peculiar set of values and regulatory goals . . . and states
might be more responsive to technological change and would be able to
adapt more quickly to proposals for innovation.”229
However, there are overwhelming drawbacks to exclusive state
regulatory control. State Gaming Commissions and state legislators have
acknowledged the need for strong federal support of enforcement
agencies.230 States believe geofencing their borders is sufficient to control
intrastate sports gambling,231 but Full Committee Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee Bob Goodlatte and the expert testimony of Jon
Bruning, Counsel of the Coalition to Stop Online Gambling, are acutely
suspicious of states’ ability to handle an internet that knows no borders.232
Online sports gambling is the most lucrative avenue for the industry, as
“most of New Jersey’s sports bets have been placed online ($539 million)
compared with in person at a casino or racetrack ($388 million).”233 Sports
leagues, the internet, and cybersecurity are not confined to state borders.
Chairman Goodlatte observed:
With the development of the Internet, however, state prohibitions and
regulations governing gambling have become increasingly hard to enforce
as electrometric communications move freely across borders. Many
gambling operations are beginning to take advantage of the ease with
which communications can cross state lines in order to elicit illegal bets
and wagers from individuals in jurisdictions that prohibit those
activities.234
Prohibiting cybersecurity lapses and preventing sports gambling on
nonpublic information are critical to maintaining integrity in the sport and
protecting consumers as well as the privacy of the athletes.
On December 19, 2018, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced a bipartisan federal bill that “would have
the U.S. Justice Department set minimum standards for states to offer sports
betting.”235 The Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018236 looks to
229. Id. at 165.
230. See Glanz, supra note 222.
231. See Harris: Post-PASPA, supra note 227, at 13 (defining geolocation and geofencing as
“[g]eolocation is [the] process by which a user’s location can be identified through use of their
mobile device. Geolocation typically calls upon multiple resources such as GPS, WIFI, or mobile
cell tower triangulation through the use of radio-frequency (RF) technology.” Geofencing creates
virtual borders that can use this geolocation to trigger alarms if the mobile devices enters or exits
the boundary.)
232. See Bruning: Post-PASPA, supra note 111, at 4–5.
233. Wayne Parry, New Jersey sport betting market closing in on $1B mark, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 12, 2018, https://www.apnews.com/70681866fb5f4be79c62a7f24b467971.
234. See Bruning: Post-PASPA, supra note 111, at 4–5 (quoting Chairman Goodlatte).
235. Wayne Parry, AP NewsBreak: Feds eye move to regulate legal sports betting,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 19, 2018, https://apnews.com/a3e2b43f3931436e8156f54471ad5fc3.
236. Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, 115 S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).
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address integrity concerns that cannot be patrolled within state borders.237
Schumer emphasized, “I knew that Congress had an obligation to ensure
that the integrity of the games we love was never compromised. That is
why I believe the time is now to establish a strong national integrity
standard for sports betting that will protect consumers and the games
themselves from corruption.”238 Leagues, such as the NFL, PGA, MLB,
NHL, and NBA, have sought a uniform set of rules as opposed to the
patchwork of laws currently differing in each state.239 Most importantly,
regarding the issues presented in this note, “the federal bill also would
create a National Sports Wagering Clearinghouse to receive and share
sports wagering data and suspicious transaction reports among sports
wagering operators, state regulators, sports organizations, and federal and
state law enforcement.”240 Schumer and Hatch admitted this bill is a
placeholder and the result of major efforts since theMurphy decision.241
CONCLUSION
With the introduction of the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act and
the proposal of a National Clearinghouse, sports betting is trending towards
a federal regulatory framework. Federal regulators cannot lose sight of
pressing issues of cybersecurity within the sports industry and the
regulatory bodies most suitable to enforce the integrity and viability of a
thriving United States sports betting industry. Both the SEC and FTC,
federal regulatory agencies, have the expansive power to conduct
investigations and bring both civil actions in federal court or administrative
actions through their Division of Enforcement.242 These government
agencies have the expertise and the proper resources to protect consumers
and the markets. The federal regulatory framework incorporating aspects of
the SEC and FTC to “administer the law, promulgate and enforce
regulations, and coordinate regulation with states”243 will be highly
beneficial to an internet and data-driven sports gambling industry. As the
sports betting industry continues to grow, a National Sports Wagering
Clearinghouse may not be sufficient or possess the necessary authority to
prove effective. “It would be unfortunate if the expansion of sports betting
in the U.S. were threatened or stunted because of regulatory failings that
undermined the integrity of the activity[,]”244 and a federal agency
237. See Parry, supra note 235.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Senator Schumer and Senator Hatch do not anticipate this bill to pass, but they hope it will
be foundational for future work in federally regulating sports betting. Id.
242. See What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html. (last visited Nov. 28,
2018); see also FTC: What We Do, supra note 154.
243. Miller & Cabot, supra note 153, at 171.
244. Id. at 183.
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dedicated to sports wagering, like an SEC to the securities or FTC to
consumer protection, will provide proper safeguards.
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AARON TWERSKI, B.S., J.D., Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law
MARJORIE S. WHITE, A.B., J.D., Associate Professor of Clinical Law
Visiting Faculty
LAUREN FIELDER-REDMAN, B.A., LL.M., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor of Law
YEHONATANGIVATI, Ph.D., S.J.D., LL.M., M.A., LL.B., Visiting Associate Professor of Law
MEG HOLZER, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
CATHERINEKIM, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor of Law
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law
GABRIELLEMARSHALL, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
CHRISTOPHERMICHAELSEN, LL.M., PhD, Visiting Adjunct Professor of Law
THANE PITTMAN, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law
CARMENMARIA REY, B.A., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Clinical Law
ALLAN J. SAMANSKY, B.A., M.A., J.D. Visiting Professor of Law
CECILIA A. SILVER, A.B., M.St., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor of Legal Writing
Librarians
JUDY BAPTISTE-JOSEPH, B.A., M.L.S., Cataloging Librarian
CAROLYN J. BROWN, B.A., M.L.I.S., J.D., Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law
KATHY DARVIL, A.B., M.S.I., J.D., Access Services/Reference Librarian
and Adjunct Professor of Law
JEAN J. DAVIS, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Associate Librarian for International Law
and Adjunct Professor of Law
JEFF GABEL, B.F.A., M.F.A., M.L.I.S., Catalog & E-Resources Manager
LOREEN PERITZ, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.I.S., Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law
SUE SILVERMAN, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S Reference Librarian and Adjunct Professor of Law
JANET SINDER, A.B., J.D., M.S., Director of the Library and Professor of Law
ERIC YAP, A.B., J.D., M.I.M, M.L.I.S., Reference Librarian
HAINAN YU, B.A., M.S., Systems Librarian
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STUART SUBOTNICK ’68
Chairman of the Board
President and Chief Executive Officer
Metromedia Company
FRANCIS J. AQUILA ’83
Vice Chairman of the Board
Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP
DAVIDM. BARSE ’87
DMB Holdings
DENNIS J. BLOCK ’67
Senior Chairman
Greenberg Traurig, Global Mergers and Acquisitions Practice
FREDERICKCOHEN ’67
Duane Morris, LLP
FREDERICK CURRY ‘03
Deloitte Financial Advisory Services, LLP
JEFFREY J. FEIL ’73
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Feil Organization
MARTIN A. FISCHER ’64
West Center Associates
JEFFREYD. FORCHELLI ’69
Forchelli, Deegan, Terrana, LLP
DEBRAHUMPHREYS ’84
Founder & Chair of the Board of Trustees
Thomas Jefferson Independent Day School
ROBERTM. KAUFMAN ’57
Proskauer Rose, LLP
HON. CLAIRE KELLY ’93
Judge
U.S. Court of International Trade
EILEEN T. NUGENT ’78
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP
JOHN P. OSWALD ’84
President and Chief Executive Officer
Capital Trust Group
HON.RAMONE. REYES, JR. ‘92
Judge
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of NY
STEVEN G. SCHEINFELD ‘85
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP
LAWRENCE A. SUCHAROW ’75
Co-Chairman
LabatonSucharow
STEVEN L. ZELKOWITZ
Chief Executive Officer
Sycamore Energy Consulting
Recent Graduate Trustee Members
ANNA ASHUROV ’12
Vice President, Financing Group
Goldman Sachs
AN DUONG ’12
Vice President, Head of Strategy & Analytics
Operational Risk Assurance
Bank of New York Mellon
Members Emeriti
ROBERT B. CATELL
Chairman
Advanced Energy Research and Technology Center (AERTC) at
New York State University at Stony Brook
FRANCESMARGOLIS FRIEDMAN ’39
FLORENCE SUBIN ’75



